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 A recent programme of research at the Centre
for Economic Performance at the London
School of Economics addresses the role of
geography in determining trade flows, the
location of economic activity, and the extent
of income differentials between countries.2
Although not directed especially at the
problems faced by small or isolated eco-
nomies, the central issues researched are the
interactions between scale and proximity.
There are benefits from being large and from
being close to centres of economic activity,
and the research seeks to understand these
benefits, assess their magnitude, and evaluate
the rate at which they fall off with distance
from the centre. The purpose of this paper is
to draw out some of the implications of this
research for small and isolated economies that
are deprived of these benefits.
The point of departure is to pose the ques-
tion, why do isolation and distance matter for
economic performance? There are several
main considerations. The first is simply that
having good access to markets is valuable for
firms. The access can derive from two sources:
one is proximity to other countries that can
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This paper explores the economic implications of isolation and remoteness. Evidence on
the impact of distance on trade costs and trade flows is reviewed, and the effects of
remoteness on real incomes are investigated. Empirical work confirms the predictions of
theory, that distance from markets and sources of supply can have a significant negative
impact on per capita income.  The possible implications of new technologies for these
spatial inequalities are discussed. Keywords:  Economic isolation, market access, trade
costs. JEL classification:  F1, R1
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other is domestic scale, i.e. the extent to which
the home market can provide an alternative to
exports. Countries that are both remote and
small forego both these sources of market
access. The second consideration is access to
suppliers of intermediate and capital goods.
Again, the supply of these goods can be from
imports or domestic supply, and remoteness
and smallness will have the effect of impeding
the supply and raising the prices of these
goods. A further penalty may arise if the flow
of ideas and technologies is curtailed with
distance. Although the determinants of these
flows is not well understood, there is a good
deal of evidence that proximity to centres of
technology matters in both the development
and application of R&D and we present some
of this evidence below.
These forces can give rise to spatial
clustering of economic activity, showing up
both at the level of a single industry (eg elec-
tronics in Silicon Valley or financial services
in London) and at a more aggregate level (the
formation of cities and industrial districts).
There is evidence – derived from studies of
subnational data in both the US and the EU
– that productivity levels are higher where
economic activity is dense, with causality run-
ning from density to productivity.3This effect
can be a source of benefit for small and densely
populated city states – a Singapore or Hong-
Kong effect. However, many more countries
lack the scale to develop their own clusters of
activity, and suffer the costs of remoteness
from existing centres.
Although this is not an exhaustive list of
the costs of smallness the remainder of the
paper will focus on drawing out some of the
facts that have been established concerning
these forces.4 We look first (section 2) at the
direct effects of distance on economic inter-
actions, particularly the cost of making trades
across space. We then turn (section 3) to their
implications for per capita income levels.
Finally, (section 4), we present a few ideas on
the possible effects of new technologies on
these relationships.
The direct costs of distance
Distance and economic interactions:
However much we hear about globalisation, a
startling feature of economic life is how local
most economic interactions are, and how
sharply they decline with distance. Trade
economists have explored this relationship
with ‘gravity models’, in which bilateral trade
flows between countries are explained by the
economic mass (eg, GDP) of the exporter and
importer countries, and ‘between-country’
variables such as distance, and perhaps also
whether they share a common border,
language, or membership of a regional inte-
gration agreement. Extensive data permits the
gravity trade model to be estimated on the
bilateral trade flows of one hundred or more
countries, and studies find that the elasticity
of trade flows with respect to distance is
around -0.9 to -1.5. This implies that volumes
of trade decline very steeply with distance.
Table 1 expresses trade volumes at different
distances, relative to their value at 1000km;
with a representative value of this elasticity of
-1.25, doubling distance more than halves
trade flows; by 4000km volumes are down by
82% and by 8000km down by 93%. 
Similar methodologies have been used to
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3.  Ciccone and Hall (1996) for the US, Ciccone (2002) for the EU.
4.  Other factors that are important are economies of scale in public sector activities and the commodity
concentration of small countries’ exports, with the associated high levels of variability of export earnings.
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are also reported in Table 1. Portes and Rey
(1999) study cross-border equity transactions
(using data for 14 countries accounting for
around 87% of global equity market capitali-
sation, 1989–96). Their main measure of
country mass is stock market capitalisation,
and their baseline specification gives an
elasticity of transactions with respect to
distance of  -0.85. This indicates again how –
controlling for the characteristics of the
countries – distance matters. Other authors
have studied foreign direct investment flows.
Data limitations mean that the set of coun-
tries is quite small, and the estimated gravity
coefficient is smaller, although still highly
significant; for example, Di Mauro, (2000)
finds an elasticity of FDI flows with respect to
distance of -0.42. The effect of distance on
technology flows has been studied by Keller
(2001) who looks at the dependence of total
factor productivity (TFP) on R&D stocks 
(i.e. cumulated R&D expenditures), for 12
industries in the G-7 countries, 1971–95. The
R&D stocks include both the own country
stock, and foreign country stocks weighted by
distance.5 Both own and foreign country
stocks are significant determinants of each
countries’ TFP and so too is the distance
effect, with R&D stocks in distant economies
having much weaker effects on TFP than do
R&D stocks in closer economies. The final
column in table 1 illustrates his results by
computing the spillover effects of R&D in
more distant economies relative to an
economy 1000km away; the attenuation due
to distance is once again dramatic.6
In addition, we also know that borders
have a major effect in reducing economic
interactions. Evidence from Canadian – US
trade suggests that even that most innocuous
of borders has a huge impact. On average, the
exports of Canadian provinces to other
Canadian provinces are some twenty times
larger than their exports to equivalently
situated US states (Helliwell 1997), and
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5.  Distance weighting according to exp(-θ distanceij))
6.  To try and identify the channels through which technical knowledge is transmitted Keller investigates not just
distance between countries, but also the volume of trade between them, their bilateral FDI holdings, and their
language skills (the share of the population in country i that speaks the language of country j). Adding these
variables renders simple geographical distance insignificant; around two-thirds of the difference in bilateral
technology diffusion is accounted for by trade patterns, and one sixth each through FDI and language. How-
ever, all these variables are themselves declining with distance.
Table 1.
Economic interactions and distance. 
(Flows relative to their magnitude at 1000km)
Trade Equity  flows FDI Technology
(θ = -1.25) (θ = -0.85) (θ = -0.42)
1000km 1 1 1 1
2000km 0.42 0.55 0.75 0.65
4000km 0.18 0.31 0.56 0.28
8000km 0.07 0.17 0.42 0.05
Sources: see text.
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suggests that the border imposes barriers to
arbitrage comparable to 1,700 miles of
physical space (Engel and Rogers 1996).
Overall then, these facts tell us that geography
still matters greatly for economic interaction.
The magnitude of shipping costs:
Underlying the rate of decline of these inter-
actions are a variety of costs. The easiest to
measure and observe are freight charges,
although other costs of time in transit and
information costs are quite possibly more
important.
Shipping costs on short or heavily used
routes are typically quite low. For the US
freight expenditure incurred on imports was
only 3.8% of the value of imports; equivalent
numbers for, eg, Brazil and Paraguay are 7.3%
and 13.3% (Hummels 1999a, from customs
data). However, these values incorporate the
fact that most trade is with countries that are
close, and in goods that have relatively low
transport costs. Looking at transport costs
unweighted by trade volumes gives much
higher numbers. Thus if we take all possible
bilateral trade flows for which data is available
(some 20,000 combinations of importer and
exporter countries) the median cif/fob ratio is
1.28, implying transport and insurance costs
amounting to 28% of the value of goods
shipped. Looking across commodities, an
unweighted average of freight rates is typically
2 to 3 times higher than the trade weighted
average rate. 
Determinants of shipping costs
Estimates of the determinants of transport
costs are given in Hummels (1999b) and
Limao and Venables (2001). These studies
typically find elasticities of transport costs
with respect to distance of between 0.2 and
0.3, meaning that a doubling of the distance
over which goods are shipped increases freight
costs by around 20%. Sharing a common
border substantially reduces transport costs
and overland distance is around 7 times more
expensive than sea distance. 
In addition to the effects of distance and
mode of transport, shipping costs are highly
route specific, reflecting densities of traffic
flow and monopoly power. For example, the
cost of shipping a standard container from
Baltimore to Durban is $2,500; shipping the
1,600km further to Lusaka costs an additional
$2,500, while the 347Km from Durban to
Maseru (Lesotho) costs an additional $7,500.
(Quotes from the shipping company used by
the World Bank, cited in Limao and Venables
2001). Fink, Mattoo and Neagu (2000) study
the impact of anti-competitive practises in the
shipping industry, and estimate that these
raise prices by more than 25%: the break-up
of private carrier agreements would, they
estimate, save transport costs of $2billion pa
on imports to the US alone. 
Landlocked countries:
Landlocked countries face severe cost penal-
ties. Research by Limao and Venables (2001)
indicates that a representative landlocked
country has transport costs approximately
50% greater than does a representative coastal
economy. Infrastructure quality (as measured
by a composite of index of transport and
communications networks) is also important.
While this matters for all countries, it is
particularly important for landlocked
countries, dependent on both their own and
their transit countries’ infrastructure. Bad
infrastructure (at the 75th percentile of the
distribution) makes landlocked countries’
transport costs a full 75% higher than those a
representative coastal economy.
These higher transport costs have a large
impact on trade flows. The median land-
locked economy (controlling for other
factors) has trade flows 60% lower than the
96 Stephen Redding and Anthony J. Venables
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is poor own infrastructure and transit country
infrastructure, then trade is 75% lower than
for the median coastal economy. 
The costs of time in transit:
Direct shipping costs are only part of the costs
of distance. Also important are costs of search,
i.e. finding and identifying trading partners
and coordinating trades. Time in transit is
important, and perhaps increasingly impor-
tant as firms seek to apply ‘just-in-time’
management methods. Recent work by Hum-
mels (2000) provides interesting evidence on
the magnitude of time costs. He analyses data
on some 25 million observations of shipments
into the US, some by air and some by sea
(imports classified at the 10-digit commodity
level, by exporter country, and by district of
entry to the US for 25 years). Given data on
the costs of each mode and the shipping times
from different countries he is able to estimate
the implicit value of time saved by using air
transport. The numbers are quite large. The
cost of an extra day’s travel is (from estimates
on imports as a whole) around 0.3% of the
value shipped. For manufacturing sectors, the
number goes up to 0.5%, costs that are
around 30 times larger than the interest
charge on the value of the goods. One
implication of these is that freight costs alone
(and the cif/fob ratio) grossly understate the
costs of distance. Another is that transport
costs have fallen much more through time
than suggested by looking at freight charges
alone. The share of US imports going by air
freight rose from zero to 30% between 1950
to 1998, and containerization approximately
doubled the speed of ocean shipping.
Together these give a reduction in shipping
time of 26 days, equivalent to a shipping cost
reduction worth 12–13% of the value of
goods traded.
Remoteness and real income 
The previous section made the point that
distance matters greatly for economic inter-
actions. How does this feed into the distribu-
tion of income across countries? A number of
mechanisms might be at work, including the
effects of investment flows and technology
transfers. Here, to illustrate effects, we con-
centrate just on the way in which trade flows
can generate international income gradients
between central and peripheral countries.
The effect of distance on factor prices is
easily seen through a simple example. Suppose
that half of a firm’s costs are intermediate
goods, and one third labour, the remaining
being returns to capital. How does the wage
that a firm can afford to pay (while just break-
ing even) depend on the costs it has to bear on
shipping its output to final consumers and
importing its intermediate inputs? It turns out
that a firm that faces 20% transport costs can
only afford to pay labour approximately 20%
as much as can a firm that faces zero transport
costs. As transport costs rise to 30% the wage
the firm can afford to pay drops to 10%, and
at 40% transport costs the firm can survive
only if it pays its workers nothing. These
numbers are based on an example where the
cost of capital is the same in the remote
country as in the centre. If this cost is higher,
then wages in remote countries are depressed
even further.
The point of this example is that in remote
locations value added gets squeezed in two
ways – the firm receives less for its output and
pays more for imported equipment and inter-
mediate goods. This means that even quite
modest transport costs can have quite a
dramatic effect on the wage that firms can
afford to pay, and suggests that there will be
quite steep ‘wage gradients’ from central to
peripheral locations.
Redding and Venables (2001) measure
these wage gradients for a sample of 101 coun-
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nomically correct measures of ‘foreign market
access’ (FMA). This, like a measure of market
potential, aggregates expenditure in different
countries, with weights inversely proportional
to distance and also depending on whether
countries share a common border, are islands
or are landlocked.8 Thus, countries close to
large foreign export markets have a high value
FMA, while remote countries have low values
of this measure.
Figure 1 presents the scatterplot of the rela-
tionship between this variable and per capita
income (both measured in logs, country codes
given in the appendix), illustrating a strong
positive relationship between the variables.
For example, looking just within Europe,
there is evidence of a wage gradient from 
Belgium/Luxembourg (countries with the
best foreign market access) through France,
Britain, to Spain, Portugal and Greece. Several
other points stand out. One is that a number
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7.  Wage gradients can be estimated within as well as between countries. Thus for the United States, Hanson (1998)
provides evidence that variation in wages across counties is linked to differential access to markets, even after
controlling for a variety of other considerations such as levels of human capital and amenities. For Mexico,
Hanson (1996, 1997) finds a regional wage gradient centred on Mexico City prior to trade liberalization and
the partial breakdown of this regional wage gradient after liberalization as production re-orientated towards the
United States
8.  The relative importance of these factors is found from econometric estimation of some specifications of a gravity
model, see Redding and Venables (2001) for details.
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quence of remoteness from export markets –
eg Australia, New Zealand, Japan, USA.
However, looking at the bottom right-hand
area of the figure, good foreign market access
provides a safety net against very low incomes
– despite the relatively poor performance of
former communist countries. 
As noted in the introduction, market
access is derived both from proximity to
export markets, and from access to a large
domestic market. Both proximity and scale
matter. The scale effect was absent from figure
1, but is included in figure 2, where the hori-
zontal axis is the sum of foreign market access
(FMA) and ‘domestic market access’ (DMA)
a measure of domestic market size adjusted for
the area of the country. Combining these
effects provides very strong evidence of a wage
gradient, indicating the importance of both
proximity and scale in determining income
levels.
Figures 1 and 2 just give market access (the
penalty of being remote from markets) but in
addition ‘supplier access’ matters. One of the
mechanisms by which geographical remote-
ness depresses wages is the high price of
imported equipment and intermediate goods
in remote locations. Figure 3 presents some
direct empirical evidence on the relationship
between access to sources of supply and the
relative price of these goods. The horizontal
axis gives the proper measure of access to for-
eign suppliers of manufactures (FSA), again
derived from trade data, and the vertical axis
gives the relative price of machinery and
equipment in countries for which data is avail-
able. We see a statistically significant negative
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tries have to pay higher prices for these goods,
this contributing to the squeeze on the wages
that firms in these countries can afford to pay.
Quantifying the effects:
Per capita incomes depend on additional fac-
tors, as well as market and supplier access, and
Redding and Venables undertake economet-
ric analysis incorporating a set of other vari-
ables. These include measures of endowments
and of the quality of institutions, which are
important determinants of per capita income
levels. However, the geographical variables
remain highly significant determinants of per
capita income levels even once these further
variables have been added in. 
One way of illustrating the quantitative
importance of geography is to undertake a set
of hypothetical experiments of the form: sup-
pose we move country 1 to the location of
country 2 then, holding other things equal,
what would happen to country 1’s income?
Tables 2 and 3 report the results of a few exper-
iments of this type. Being landlocked and
being an island both have a negative effect on
real income, and the first column indicates
that the penalty from being landlocked is sub-
stantial – removing it would raise income by
one-quarter.9 The cost of island status is
smaller, costing around 7% of GDP (column
2). Column (3) reports a trade policy experi-
ment: changing countries’ trade openness (as
measured by the Sachs-Warner (1995) open-
100 Stephen Redding and Anthony J. Venables
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open possible. This too yields extremely large
income gains, of around 25% for countries
that were, in 1994, quite economically closed. 
Column (4) reports the experiment of
moving a country from its present location to
that of Hungary, on the edge of the EU. The
dramatic increase in FMA brought about by
this change means that, for some of the most
remote economies in the sample, income
increases by nearly 80%.
Common borders are also important for
facilitating trade and improving market
access, and table 3 quantifies their importance
by the hypothetical experiments of closing
borders. The effects reported show that
smaller countries gain very substantially from
access to a large neighbour, as illustrated for
Mexico and the Czech Republic. However,
two small neighbours, the two African
economies, neither of which have large
markets nor supplies of manufactures to offer,
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Table 2.
Percentage change in real income from openess
Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Country Access Loss of Become Distance
to Coast Island Status Open (Central Europe)
Australia 7.3%
Sri Lanka 7.3% 20.7% 67.4%
Zimbabwe 24.0% 27.7%
Paraguay 24.0% 25.3% 79.7%
Hungary 24.0% 26.5% 58.3%
Notes: Actual values for the Sachs and Warner (1995) openness index are 1 in Australia, 0.2321 in Sri Lanka, 0.038
in Hungary, 0.077 in Paraguay, and 0 in Zimbabwe.
Source: Redding and Venables (2000).
Table 3.
Percentage change in real income from border effects
Removal of Common Border Effect on Per Capita Income
Germany - Czech Republic Germany Czech Republic
- 0.1% - 25.7%
U.S. - Mexico U.S. Mexico
- 0.5% - 27.2%
Zimbabwe-Zambia Zimbabwe Zambia
- 0.05% - 0.11%
Source: Redding and Venables (2000).
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effects. An implication of this is that South-
South regional integration schemes yield very
limited benefits compared to fuller integra-
tion into the world economy as a whole.
New technologies: the death of 
distance?
Technical progress has lead to substantial
reductions in trade costs in the last 40 years.
Shipping rates and airfreight rates have both
fallen, although the decline in these rates ended
in the 1960s and 1980s respectively. We have
already commented on the cost reductions
associated with the speeding up of shipping.
In addition to these changes the develop-
ment of information and communications
technologies (ICT) has made the transmission
of digital information virtually free. These
technologies bring great benefits to isolated
and distant economies, allowing faster and
cheaper exchange of information and ideas.
However, it is not clear that they overturn all
the economic disadvantages of isolation or
lead to the ‘death of distance’ as suggested by
some authors (Cairncross 2001). In this
section we offer a few remarks about the likely
implications of these new technologies for
isolated and distant economies.
Weightless inputs and outputs 
In some activities inputs and outputs can be
digitized – made ‘weightless’ – and shipped
virtually free of charge. These activities can be
relocated to lower wage economies, as recent
experience indicates. The highly successful
Indian software and IT-enabled services sec-
tors had output in 2000 of $8bill with exports
of $4bill. IT enabled services – call centres
(‘customer interaction centres’), medical tran-
scriptions, finance and accounting services –
had exports to the US of $0.26bill, predicted
to grow to $4bill by 2005 (Economist May 5th
2001). These are substantial size activities,
compared to total Indian exports of $45bill in
2000, but are less than 1% of total US imports
of around $950billion.10
Development of these activities may prove
extremely valuable to isolated and distant
economies, although a couple of provisos need
to be made. First, as activities are codified and
digitized, so not only can they be moved cost-
lessly through space, but also they are typically
subject to very large productivity increases and
price reductions. Thus, the effect of ICT on,
say, airline ticketing, has been primarily to
replace labour by computer equipment, and
only secondarily to allow remaining workers to
be employed in India rather than the US or
Europe. There is continuing technical progress
in these activities so, for example, technology
that can capture voice or handwriting will soon
make Indian medical transcription obsolete.
This suggests that even if more activities
become weightless the share of world expen-
diture and employment attributable to these
activities will remain small – perhaps as little
as a few percent of world GDP.
The second point is that small economies
will face intense competition in attracting these
activities, as the experience of India already sug-
gests. There is a sense in which ‘weightless’
activities are the natural comparative advantage
of remote economies since these economies
have a comparative disadvantage in transport
intensive goods, (Venables and Limao 2002).
However, success will require both the tele-
communications infrastructure and the skill
base to attract investments.
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10. For further discussion of the concept of weightlessness and the implications of new information and commu-
nication technologies for economic growth, see Quah (1997), (2001).
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Recent years have seen the growth of both out-
sourcing and foreign direct investment (FDI),
with the associated development of produc-
tion networks or production chains. FDI has
grown faster than either income or trade. The
growth of production networks has been
studied by a number of researchers. One way
to measure its growth is by looking at trade in
components, and Yeats (1998) estimates that
30% of world trade in manufactures is now
trade in components rather than final prod-
ucts. Hummels, Ishii and Yi (2001) chart
trade flows that cross borders multiple times,
as when a country imports a component and
then re-exports it embodied in some down-
stream product. They find that (for 10 OECD
countries), the share of imported value added
in exports rose by one third between 1970 and
1990, reaching 21% of export value. 
Both FDI and outsourcing involve, in
somewhat different ways, a fragmentation of
the structure of the firm, as production is split
into geographically and/or organisationally
differerent units. From the international
perspective this fragmentation offers the
benefits of being able to move particular stages
of the production process to the lowest cost
locations – labour intensive parts to low wage
economies, and so on. However, as well as
involving potentially costly shipping of parts
and components it also creates formidable
management challenges. Product specifica-
tion and other information has to be trans-
ferred, and production schedules and quality
standards have to be monitored. Do new
technologies reduce the costs of doing this?
To the extent that pertinent information is
‘codifiable’ the answer is likely to be yes. The
use of ICT for business-to-business trade is
well documented, although it is reported to
often reduce the number of suppliers a firm
uses, rather than increase the number. In mass
production of standardized products designs
can be relatively easily codified; where the
production process is routine, daily or hourly
production runs can be reported and quality
data can be monitored. 
However, in many activities the pertinent
information cannot be codified so easily.
There are two sorts of reasons for this. One is
the inherent complexity of the activity. For
example, frequent design changes and a
process of ongoing product design and im-
provement (involving both marketing and
production engineering) may require a level of
interaction that – at present – can only be
achieved by face-to-face contact. The second
reason is to do with the fact that contracts are
incomplete, and people on either side of the
contract (or in different positions within a
single firm) have their own objectives. It is
typically expensive or impossible to ensure
that their incentives can be shaped to be com-
patible with meeting the objectives of the
firm. While new technologies may reduce the
costs of monitoring, it seems unlikely that
these problems of incomplete contracts are
amenable to a technological fix. 
What evidence is there? On the one hand,
there is the fact that in recent years there has
been a dramatic increase in the outsourcing of
activities to specialist suppliers, suggesting
that difficulties in writing contracts and
monitoring performance have been reduced.
On the other hand, a number of empirical
studies point to the continuing importance,
despite new technologies, of regular face-to-
face contact. Thus, Gaspar and Glaeser
(1998) argue that telephones are likely to be
complements, not substitutes, for face-to-face
contact as they increase the overall amount of
business interaction. They suggest that, as a
consequence, telephones have historically
promoted the development of cities. The
evidence on business travel suggests that as
electronic communications have increased so
too has travel, again indicating the impor-
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Storper (2000) draw the distinction between
‘conversational’ transactions (that can be done
at a distance by ICT) and ‘handshake’ trans-
actions that require face-to-face contact. New
technologies allow dispersion of activities that
only require ‘conversational’ transactions, but
might also increase the complexity of produc-
tion and design process, and hence increase
the proportion of activities that require ‘hand-
shake’ communication. 
Overall then, it seems that there are some
relatively straightforward activities where
knowledge can be codified, new technologies
will make management from a distance easier,
and relocation of the activity to lower wage
regions might be expected. But monitoring,
control, and information exchange in more
complex activities still requires a degree of
contact that involves proximity and face-to-
face meetings. Perhaps nowhere is this more
evident than in design and development of the
new technologies themselves.
The speeding up of production:
New technologies provide radical opportuni-
ties for speeding up parts of the overall supply
process. There are several ways this can occur.
One is simply that basic information – prod-
uct specifications, orders and invoices – can
be transmitted and processed more rapidly.
Another is that information about uncertain
aspects of the supply process can be discovered
and transmitted sooner. For example, retail-
ers’ electronic stock control can provide
manufacturers with real time information
about sales and hence about changes in
fashion and overall expenditure levels. For
intermediate goods, improved stock controls
and lean production techniques allow manu-
facturers to detect and identify defects in sup-
plies more rapidly. These changes pose the
interesting question: if some elements of the
supply process become quicker, what does this
do to the marginal value of time saved (or mar-
ginal cost of delay) in other parts of the
process? In particular, if one part of the process
that takes time is the physical shipment of
goods, then will time saving technical changes
encourage firms to move production closer to
markets, or allow them to move further away? 
There are some reasons to think that the
effect might encourage firms to move pro-
duction closer to markets. The new oppor-
tunities created for rapid response can be
exploited only if all stages of production are
fast. The highly successful Spanish clothing
chain, Zara (Economist, May 19th 2001) pro-
vides an example. It uses real time sales data,
can make a new product line in three weeks
(compared to the industry average of nine
months) and only commits 15% of produc-
tion at the start of the season (industry aver-
age 60%). It also does almost all its manufac-
turing (starting with basic fabric dyeing
through the full manufacturing process) in
house in Spain, with most of the sewing done
by 400 local cooperatives (compared to the
extensive outsourcing of other firms in the
industry).11
Just-in-time production techniques pro-
vide a further example. New technologies
have allowed much improved stock control
and ordering, and a consequent movement of
suppliers towards their customers. In a study
of the location of suppliers to the US auto-
mobile industry Klier (1999) finds that
70–80% of suppliers are located within one
days drive of the assembly plant, although
even closer location is limited by the fact that
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He also finds evidence that the concentration
of supplier plants around assembly plants has
increased since 1980, a timing that he points
out is consistent with the introduction of just-
in-time production methods. The leader in
the application of just-in-time techniques is
Toyota, whose independent suppliers are on
average only 59 miles away from its assembly
plants, to which they make eight deliveries a
day. By contrast, General Motor’s suppliers in
North America are an average of 427 miles
away from the plants they serve and make
fewer than two deliveries a day. As a result,
Toyota and its suppliers maintain inventories
that are one-fourth of General Motor’s, when
measured as a percentage of sales (Fortune,
Dec 8th 1997).
These examples suggest that, at least in
some activities, remote economies may be-
come more marginalised as a consequence of
new technologies.
Clustering still matters:
Arguments above suggest that new technolo-
gies will facilitate the relocation of some activ-
ities to lower wage locations. Other activities
may become increasingly locked in to estab-
lished centres. However, for activities that can
relocate clustering is likely to be important.
Foreign direct investment projects will tend to
go to locations where investors can see that
other investors are doing well. Firms will want
to move to locations where there is a deep pool
of skilled labour and a network of local
suppliers. These factors may militate against
relocation of these activities to small coun-
tries.
Overall then, while it is clear that new
technologies will bring many benefits, allow-
ing isolated and remote countries closer
contact with the outside world, the ‘death of
distance’ view is misplaced. It is far from clear
that new technologies will provide a straight-
forward development strategy for these
countries.
Conclusions
Th review of research in this paper is partial
in its coverage. For example, we have not dis-
cussed the implications of smallness for export
concentration and for vulnerability, but
instead concentrated on the costs of isolation
and distance. These factors choke off eco-
nomic interactions, mean that potential
investors can only pay low wages, and reduce
real income. New technologies bring benefits,
but need further study. Some activities will
become more entrenched in existing centres,
others will relocate, and the relocation will
likely lead to the formation of new clusters.
What are the policy implications of the
preceding analysis? We offer just a few points.
The first is that infrastructure improvements
are important. Changes that reduce isolation
will affect prices in the economy, having non-
marginal effects that need to properly evalu-
ated by social cost benefit analysis. These
changes do not necessarily require physical
investments. Our discussion of the costs of
time in transit point to the importance of
port, customs and other frontier delays in
deterring investments. The example of Intel’s
investment in Costa Rica is instructive: Intel
went ahead with a $300million chip facility
only after the government of Costa Rica had
guaranteed rapid customs clearance of im-
ports, free of bureaucratic and administrative
blockages. Similarly, the discussion of ship-
ping costs pointed to the barriers created by
ocean shipping cartels. Competition policy at
the international level is needed to break up
these cartels.
Second, development strategies need to
look carefully at what the comparative advan-
tage of small, distant, and isolated economies
really is. Traditional analysis points almost
The economics of isolation and distance 105
01  NOPEC  28  (2)  Venables  NY  fig    18.12.02    10:24    Side  105exclusively at factor endowments and factor
prices, but additional factors need to be taken
into account. In addition to looking to their
factor endowments and the factor intensity of
industries, remote economies should look to
‘transport intensity’ of industries. Small eco-
nomies should look to the importance of scale
in different sectors, and not just scale within
the individual firm, but scale defined to
include the size of viable clusters of firms and
pools of skilled labour.
Finally, while geography matters, so too do
many other factors, including trade policy,
institutions and factor endowments. Restric-
tive trade policy has the effect, like distance,
of making a country more economically
remote from the rest of the world. Spatial
analysis suggests that clustering is important
for many activities, indicating that small
initial advantages can translate into large
differences in outcomes, as ‘cumulative causa-
tion’ drives the growth of the cluster. This
highlights the importance of good initial
conditions in the business environment.
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Table A1: Countries in figures 1 and 2. 
1. Albania (ALB) 28. Estonia (EST) 55. Morocco (MAR) 82. Singapore (SGP)
2. Argentina (ARG)  29. Ethiopia (ETH) 56. Moldova (MDA) 83. El Salvador (SLV)
3. Armenia (ARM) 30. Finland (FIN) 57. Madagasc. (MDG) 84. Slovak Rep. (SVK)
4. Australia (AUS) 31. France (FRA) 58. Mexico (MEX) 85. Slovenia (SVN)
5. Austria (AUT) 32. Gabon (GAB) 59. Macedonia (MKD) 86. Sweden (SWE)
6. Bangladesh (BGD) 33. UK (GBR) 60. Mongolia (MNG) 87. Syria (SYR)
7. Bulgaria (BGR) 34. Greece (GRC) 61. Mozambiq. (MOZ) 88. Chad (TCD)
8. Belg./Lux (BLX) 35. Guatemala (GTM) 62. Mauritius (MUS) 89. Thailand (THA)
9. Bolivia (BOL) 36. Hong Kon (HKG) 63. Malawi (MWI) 90. Trinidad/T. (TTO)
10. Brazil (BRA) 37. Honduras (HND) 64. Malaysia (MYS) 91. Tunisia (TUN)
11. C Afr. Rp. (CAF) 38. Croatia (HRV) 65. Nicaragua (NIC) 92. Turkey (TUR)
12. Canada (CAN) 39. Hungary (HUN) 66. Netherlands (NLD) 93. Taiwan (TWN)
13. Switzerl. (CHE),  40. Indonesia (IDN) 67. Norway (NOR) 94. Tanzania (TZA)
14. Chile (CHL) 41. India (IND) 68. Nepal (NPL) 95.Uruguay (URY)
15. China (CHN) 42. Ireland (IRL) 69. New Zeal. (NZL) 96. USA (USA)
16. Cote d’Ivoire (CIV) 43. Israel (ISR) 70. Pakistan (PAK) 97. Venezuela (VEN)
17. Cameroon (CMR) 44. Italy (ITA) 71. Panama (PAN) 98. Yemen (YEM)
18. Congo Rep. (COG)  45. Jamaica (JAM) 72. Peru (PER) 99. South Afr. (ZAF)
19. Colombia (COL) 46. Jordan (JOR) 73. Philippines (PHL) 100. Zambia (ZMB)
20. Costa Rica (CRI) 47. Japan (JPN) 74.Poland (POL) 101. Zimbabwe (ZWE)
21. Czech Rep. (CZE) 48. Kazakhstan (KAZ) 75. Portugal (PRT)
22. Germany (DEU) 49. Kenya (KEN) 76. Paraguay (PRY)
23. Denmark (DNK) 50. Kyrgyz Rp. (KGZ) 77. Romania (ROM)
24. Algeria (DZA) 51. Korea, Rp. (KOR) 78. Russia (RUS)
25. Ecuador (ECU) 52. Sri Lanka (LKA) 79. Saudi Arab. (SAU)
26. Egypt (EGY) 53. Lithuania (LTU) 80. Sudan (SDN)
27. Spain (ESP) 54. Latvia (LVA) 81. Senegal (SEN)
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